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Abstract: 
In relation to the growing debate around multifunctionality, this paper attempts 
to classify alternative measures of agricultural income support according to their ability 
in achieving three policy objectives (supporting agricultural income, promoting positive 
externalities and reducing negative ones) as well as to their induced trade distortion ef-
fects. Four income support programs are considered: a production-linked payment pro-
gram, a land-based payment program and two decoupled payment programs. Their ef-
fectiveness as regards to the three policy objectives and their relatives induce trade dis-
tortion effects are examined on an equal cost/support basis through a conceptual frame-
work that allows for free entry in the sector and the land price to adjust endogenously. 
Analytical results show clearly that no program uniformly dominates others. They also 
allow to identify the key parameters that have a substantial bearing on the relative mer-
its of these programs.  
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1. Introduction 
Although there is still considerable confusion within WTO (World Trade Or-
ganisation) Member States about what is really meant by the term multifunctionality, all 
countries agree that agricultural production provides food and non-food outputs. Some 
non-food outputs are not valued by market transactions and hence can be under pro-
duced relative to what society may desire. Multifunctionality proponents claim then that 
production-linked payments are necessary to obtain socially desired non-food benefits 
because of jointness relationships between agricultural production and non-food bene-
fits. They argue that countries should have more flexibility in the domestic policy de-
sign relative to what is currently provided by the provisions of the URAA (Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture) green box. On the other hand, multifunctionality 
opponents argue that the green box provides sufficient flexibility to address non-food 
benefits, i.e., non-trade concerns, with the least distortions on trade. For these countries, 
mainly the United States (US) and the Cairns Group (CG), multifunctionality is not a 
sufficient basis for continuing to pursue production-linked policies, i.e., trade distorting 
policies according to the URAA classification of support policies. In their view, non-
food benefits are better addressed through specific instruments directly linked to public 
goods and/or positive externalities.
2 
As noted by Bohman et al. (1999), the WTO does not make judgements about 
countries’ agricultural policy objectives under the condition that policy instruments im-
plemented to realize these objectives have no, or at most minimal, trade distortion ef-
fects or effects on production (Annex 2 of the URAA). 
In this paper and in very general terms, we attempt to classify alternative "tradi-
tional" programs of agricultural income support according to their ability in achieving 
"traditional" goals of agricultural policies and to their induced trade distortion effects. 
Four income support programs (or instruments) are retained: a production-linked pay-
ment program, a land-based payment program and two decoupled payment programs, 
with or without the requirement to maintain land in agricultural use. Three agricultural 
policy goals are considered: supporting agricultural income, promoting positive exter-
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nalities and/or public goods provision and correcting negative externalities (pollution).
3 
However, as the WTO discipline requires domestic policy programs to have no, or at 
most minimal, trade distortion effects or effects on production, the WTO rule of "the 
minimal induced trade distortion" is considered as a fourth "policy objective". 
We develop a conceptual framework that allows for evaluating the impact of the 
four aforementioned programs on endogenous and various target variables. The model 
is an equilibrium displacement model with three equilibrium equations. The first one is 
the equilibrium condition in the agricultural output market, with aggregate supply equal 
to total demand (i.e., domestic demand and exports). The second one is the equilibrium 
condition in the land market, with aggregate supply equal to aggregate demand, both 
accounting for trade of land between farmers (Leathers, 1992). The third one is the en-
try/exit condition permitting the number of firms to be endogenously determined within 
the model. Hence, the model's endogenous variables are the agricultural output price, 
the land price and the number of farmers. Knowing the effects of each considered pro-
gram on these endogenous variables, the model also allows to determine their respective 
effects on various target variables such as the agricultural income, variable input 
(mainly fertilizers and pesticides) quantities used per hectare, yields per hectare and 
agricultural output exports. 
One may notice that our analysis is not concerned with efficient or optimal poli-
cies. It is interested in examining the extent to which the four retained programs achieve 
the objectives of income support, positive externality promotion and negative external-
ity reduction, while determining the trade distortions arising from the use of these in-
struments. For that purpose, the impacts of each program regarding the four considered 
policy objectives are assessed through four target variables or "policy indicators".
4 
The ability of each program to achieve the policy objective of supporting agri-
cultural income is evaluated through its respective impact on individual farmers' profit. 
The effect of the four considered programs on agricultural commodity exports is re-
tained as a measure of their induced trade distortion effects. The policy objective of 
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promoting the provision of non-food and non-market benefits is simply related to the 
number of farmers. In fact, following Hueth (2000), we assume that (most) non-food or 
non-market benefits are directly linked to the number of (high marginal cost) farmers. 
This is of course a very restrictive assumption. However it allows us to simply represent 
the multi-product nature of non-food benefits by considering that the society perceives a 
connection “between the existence of relatively high-cost farm operations and the pres-
ervation or sustainability of rural communities” (Hueth, 2000, p. 22). Finally, the policy 
objective of reducing negative externalities is directly linked to the use of variable in-
puts per hectare or to yields per hectare. In other words, we assume that negative exter-
nalities arise from an “excessive” use of variable inputs (mainly fertilizers and pesti-
cides), so that decreasing this use contributes to reduce negative externalities. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework. 
In section 3, comparative static results are derived and the effects of the four alternative 
income support programs on endogenous variables as well as on policy objectives re-
lated target variables are analysed. In section 4, these effects are compared on an equal 
cost/support basis that makes possible to classify policy instruments according to their 
ability to achieve the four considered agricultural policy objectives. Section 5 con-
cludes. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
A potential agricultural producer n has an initial endowment in land equal to  n li . 
He faces perfectly elastic supplies for all factors of production, including land, and takes 
their prices as given. However the agricultural industry experiences a rising supply 
curve for land. It is thus an increasing-cost industry (Hughes, 1980). Land can be ac-
quired/let through rental only. The buying/selling price of land is assumed to be ade-
quately approximated by the discounted sum of future rental values so that a prediction 
about the direction of the rental price is equivalent to a prediction about the direction of 
the buying/selling price (Leathers, 1992).  
There are N potential agricultural producers and N is large. In order to simplify 
presentation and analysis, we assume that they have the same production function. 
 
 
   5 
Agricultural producer behavior 
The profit-maximizing program of a potential agricultural producer n may be de-
fined as (the index n is omitted): 
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where y denotes the agricultural output, x an aggregate variable input, l the amount of 
land used for production and nf the family labor. The price of output is p, the production 
subsidy is sp, the price of the variable input is w, the rental price of land is r, the land 
subsidy is t, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production is mo and the decoupled 
subsidy without mandatory production is mno. The production function  ) , , ( nf l x f y =  is 
assumed well defined for all non-negative variable input, land and family labor quanti-
ties. It is everywhere twice-continuously differentiable, non-negative, non-decreasing 
and concave. Program (1) defines a profit function  ) , , , ( nf t r w sp p − + π  which is well de-
fined for all positive prices, everywhere twice-continuously differentiable, non-
negative, increasing, linearly homogeneous and convex in prices, increasing and con-
cave in family labor (Diewert, 1974). In program (1),  ) ( li l r −  represents the cost of rent-
ing additional land at price r per unit (in that case,  0 ) ( ≥ − li l r ) or the earnings from leas-
ing part or all of initial land endowment, also at price r per unit (in that case,  0 ) ( ≤ − li l r ). 
Output supply, land demand and variable input demand equations are obtained 
by applying Hotelling’s lemma, i.e., 
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The individual supply function for the agricultural commodity is an increasing 
function of the output price, the production subsidy and the land subsidy. It is decreas-
ing in the variable input price and the rental price of land, and it does not depend on 
decoupled subsidies with or without mandatory production (equation 2). The individual 
derived demand function for land is an increasing function of the output price, the pro-
duction subsidy and the land subsidy. It is decreasing in the rental price of land, and it   6 
does not depend on decoupled subsidies with or without mandatory production. Impacts 
of changes in the variable input price on land demand depend on (Marshallian) substitu-
tion and complementarity relationships between production factors x and l (equation 3a). 
 
System equilibrium equations 
The model involves three equilibrium equations. The first one is the equilibrium 
condition in the output market. It requires the aggregate supply of the agricultural com-
modity to equal the aggregate demand (i.e., domestic demand and exports). The second 
one is the equilibrium condition in the land market, which implies that there is zero ex-
cess supply in this market. The third equilibrium equation corresponds to the entry-exit 
condition. 
The equilibrium equation in the agricultural commodity market may be written 
as:  
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where K is the number of producers who effectively produce, DD(p) is the domestic ag-
gregate demand function and DE(p) is the export aggregate demand function. 
The equilibrium equation in the land market may be written as:  
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Land supply is the sum of initial endowments in land of the N potential farmers, 
plus an upward-sloping function  ) , ( ls r Sl  which corresponds to land supplied by land 
owners who are not potential farmers ( 0 ≥ r Sl ). Land demand is the sum of derived de-
mands for land by the K farmers who decide to enter and produce the agricultural com-
modity, plus a downward-sloping function  ) , ( ld r Dl  which corresponds to land de-
manded by land users who are not potential farmers ( 0 ≤ r Dl ). Parameters ls  and ld  are 
function shifters. 
The last equilibrium equation corresponds to the entry-exit condition. A poten-
tial farmer will choose not to enter if he can earn more money by leasing out all his land 
endowment and holding the best possible alternative in terms of wages (PA), i.e., if:   7 
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As a result, a potential farmer with initial endowment li will be indifferent be-
tween farming and not farming if: 
 
(7)  PA mo nf t r w sp p = + − + π ) , , , (  
 
From (7), one notes that the entry-exit decision does not depend on the initial 
land endowment li. However this latter has a proportional impact, for a given land rental 
price, on total profit a farmer can earn by entering and producing (see program 1). One 
also notes that the entry-exit decision does not depend on the decoupled subsidy without 
mandatory production (mno), but on the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production 
(mo). At this stage, it is useful to explain the working of both types of decoupled subsi-
dies. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the initial situation corresponds to a 
no support regime with Ki farmers who produce. Let us now assume that the govern-
ment seeks to support farmers’ incomes by means of a decoupled subsidy without man-
datory production. Equation (6) implies that the latter is granted to the Ki farmers only, 
even if some of them decide to go out and not to produce in the new situation, but not to 
new entrants. Let us now assume that the income support instrument is a decoupled sub-
sidy with mandatory production. Equation (6) shows then that the latter is granted to 
any farmer who decides to produce in this new regime, but not to farmers who produced 
in the initial situation and now prefer to go out and lease out all their land endowment. 
These assumptions allow us to write the entry and exit conditions in only one equation, 
i.e., equation (7). 
The solution of equations (4), (5) and (7) gives the equilibrium price of the agri-
cultural commodity p, the equilibrium rental price of land r, and the equilibrium number 
of farms, K, composing the industry. The analysis of farm programs proceeds then by 
totally differentiating (4), (5) and (7), and solving the resulting system. 
The four considered alternative/complementary income support instruments are 
the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production mno, the decoupled subsidy with 
mandatory production mo, the land subsidy t, and the production subsidy sp. These four 
instruments are primarily designed to support farmers’ incomes, but they do have im-  8 
pacts as regards to other policy objectives. Then, we assume that the government seeks 
to achieve four different policy objectives: to maintain/increase the individual earnings 
of persons engaged in agriculture (policy objective n° 1), to maintain/increase the provi-
sion of positive externalities and/or public goods (policy objective n° 2), to reduce the 
negative environmental consequences of an excessive use of potentially polluting inputs 
(policy objective n° 3) and to minimise the trade distortion induced by domestic pro-
grams (policy objective n° 4). 
As previously underlined, the ability of each income support program to achieve 
each of the four aforementioned policy objectives is evaluated through four target vari-
ables. The target variable associated with policy objective n° 1 is the individual total 
profit of farmers (denoted PRO). We consider that a program inducing an increase (a 
decrease) in the individual total profit of farmers contributes positively (negatively) to 
the policy objective of supporting agricultural income. The target variable associated 
with policy objective n° 4 is the agricultural commodity exports (denoted X). We con-
sider that a program resulting in an increase (decrease) in agricultural exports goes 
against (favours) the policy objective of preserving the compatibility of domestic pro-
grams with WTO rules. The target variable associated with policy objective n° 3 is indi-
vidual yields per hectare (denoted in for individual intensification).
5 We admit that a 
program inducing a decrease (an increase) in yields per hectare contributes positively 
(negatively) to the policy objective of reducing negative externalities arising from inten-
sification of agricultural production. Finally, the target variable associated with policy 
objective n° 2 is the number of farmers. The preservation of a “large” number of rela-
tively small family-style farms is generally viewed as more effective to the sustainabil-
ity and well-being of rural communities than a “small” number of relatively large farms 
(European Commission, 1999; Hueth, 2000). In a more general but cumbersome 
framework where potential farmers have different abilities (a higher ability correspond-
ing to lower marginal costs), any increase in the number of farms/farmers means that 
relatively high-cost farmers choose to enter and produce (Leathers, 1992; Guyomard et 
al., 2000). One can reasonably assume that the society derives non-market benefits from 
the production of these relatively high-cost farmers by valuing their production beyond 
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its market value (Hueth, 2000). Under this assumption, the policy objective of an in-
creased number of farms/farmers may be viewed as a reduced form of a more general 
policy objective, i.e., ensuring the fulfillment of the positive multifunctional role of ag-
riculture. Since the same conclusions are derived from both the “general” model (farm-
ers with different abilities) and the “simplified” model used in this paper (farmers with 
identical abilities), one can interpret any increase in the number of farms/farmers as an 
increased supply of public goods/positive externalities produced by agriculture. 
 
3. Impacts of alternative agricultural income support programs 
We directly derive the comparative static effects of the four considered policy 
instruments on the price of the agricultural output, the rental price of land and the num-
ber of farms/farmers. Then, using these comparative static results, we may obtain the 
effects of policy instruments on farmers' total profit (from (1)), on yields per hectare 
(from (2) and (3a)) and on exports (from the export aggregate demand function  ) (p DE ). 
Details of calculations are provided in Appendix. 
 
The decoupled subsidy without mandatory production 
Since the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production (mno) does not enter 
the three equilibrium equations (4), (5) and (7), it has no impact on the system but pro-
ducers’ incomes. In particular, it has no impact on the number of farmers, the intensifi-
cation level (yields per hectare) and the volume of agricultural commodity exports. 
 
The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production 
The effects of a decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) on the en-
dogenous and target variables are given by: 
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where  l nf l w sp p y
l
y log / ) , , , ( log ∂ + ∂ = ε is the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of 
output y with respect to land quantity l, while  y nf t r w y l
y
l log / ) , , , ( log ∂ − ∂ = ε  is the re-
stricted Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land l with respect to output level y. 
Hence, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production has only three unam-
biguous effects: a positive effect on the number of farms/farmers (equation 10), a nega-
tive effect on the farmers' output supply (equation 12) and a negative effect on the farm-
ers' land demand (equation 13). The impacts of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory 
production on all other variables are indeterminate and depend closely on the levels of 
l
y ε  and 
y
l ε  relative to one. 
The effect of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production on the price of 
the agricultural commodity (equation 8) is unambiguously negative when the restricted 
Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to land quantity (
l
y ε ) is lower than 
unity. When this elasticity is strictly greater than one, the effect can become positive if 
the positive impact of the first right-hand side term of (8) outweighs the negative impact 
of the second right-hand side term of (8). The effect on the rental price of land (equation 
9) is unambiguously positive when the restricted Hicksian derived demand elasticity of 
land with respect to output level (
y
l ε ) is lower than unity. When this elasticity is strictly 
greater than one, the effect can become negative if the negative impact of the first right-
hand side term of (9) outweighs the positive impact of the second right-hand side term 
of (9). On may notice that convexity in prices of the profit function defined by program 




y ε ε .  is always smaller than one. It follows 
that the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production cannot simultaneously increase 
the output price and decrease the land price.
6  
The impact of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production on total profit 
PRO (equation 11) is proportional to the initial land endowment of the farmer. It is posi-
tive (respectively, negative) when the rental price of land increases (respectively, de-
creases). 
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The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production will unambiguously reduce 
the farmer’s output supply (equation 12) and the farmer’s land demand (equation 13), 
but its effect on intensification (yields per hectare) is indeterminate (equation 14). It will 
be positive when  1 ≥ ε
y
l  and  1 ≤ ε
l
y , negative when  1 ≤ ε
y
l  and  1 ≥ ε
l
y , and indeterminate 
when  1 ≤ ε
y
l  and  1 ≤ ε
l
y . 
The impact of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production on agricultural 
commodity exports (equation 15) is indeterminate. It is positive (respectively, negative) 
when the price of the agricultural commodity decreases (respectively, increases). 
The main results of the comparative static analysis are summarized in Table 1 
(for the four income support instruments). As regards the four policy objectives consid-
ered in this paper, the only unambiguous effect of the decoupled subsidy with manda-
tory production is to increase the number of farms/farmers. Hence, one may conclude 
that the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production contributes positively to policy 
objective n° 2 (positive externality provision). For the three other policy objectives, the 
effects cannot be predicted with theory alone. The total profit of a farmer can decrease 
(a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for this being that the restricted Hicksian de-
rived demand elasticity of land with respect to output is strictly greater than one), and 
agricultural commodity exports can decrease as well (a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for this being that the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with 
respect to land is strictly greater than one). The impact of the decoupled subsidy with 
mandatory production on yields per hectare is indeterminate, depending on orders of 
magnitude relative to one of the two aforementioned elasticities. 
The ambiguous effects of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production may 
be explained as follows. All other things being equal, the decoupled subsidy favors the 
entry of new producers into farming, creating subsequently excess supply in the output 
market and excess demand in the land market. A new equilibrium of our economy may 
be obtained through either an output price decrease and an increase in the rental price of 
land ( 1 ≤ ε
l
y   and  1 ≤ ε
y
l ), an output price increase compensated by a higher increase in 
the rental price of land ( 1 > ε
l
y and  1 ≤ ε
y
l ), or an output price decrease sufficient to cope 
with a decrease in the rental price of land ( 1 ≤ ε
l
y   and  1 > ε
y
l ). These price adjustments 
obviously reduce the incentives for potential producers to enter the sector, but never 
outweigh the initial positive effect of the decoupled subsidy on the number of farmers.  
   12 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
The land subsidy 
The effects of a land subsidy (t) on the endogenous and target variables are simi-
larly derived from the total differentiation of equations (4), (5) and (7). We obtain: 
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Thus, the land subsidy will unambiguously decrease the output price (equation 
16), increase the rental price of land (equation 17), decrease yields per hectare (equation 
19), increase the total profit of a farmer (equation 20) and increase the exports of the 
agricultural commodity (equation 21). However, its effect on the number of 
farms/farmers is indeterminate (equation 18). When the restricted Hicksian derived de-
mand elasticity of land with respect to output is lower than one, the effect of the land 
subsidy is to increase the number of farmers. When this elasticity is greater than one, 
the effect is ambiguous and can become negative if the negative impact of the first 
right-hand side term of the square brackets in (18) outweighs the positive impact of the 
second right-hand side term of the square brackets in (18). 
Hence, regarding the four considered policy objectives, one may conclude that 
the land subsidy contributes positively to policy objectives n° 1 (agricultural income 
support) and n° 3 (negative externality reduction), but at the expense of increasing trade 
distortion effects (policy objective n° 4). Its contribution to policy objective n° 2 (posi-
tive externality provision) is ambiguous. It may be positive or negative, depending 
closely on the level of 
y
l ε  relative to one. 
Some further results can be wrung out of equations (16) to (21) when 
0 = = r r Dl Sl . Using the developed expression of detM  provided in Appendix, we obtain: 
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(22)  0 / = dt dp  
(23)  1 / = dt dr  
(24)  0 / = dt dK  
(25)  0 / = dt din  
(26)  li dt dPRO = /  
(27)  0 / = dt dX  
 
Hence, in the particular case where the land supply and demand coming from the 
rest of the economy correspond to fixed amounts, the only non-zero effects of the land 
subsidy are to raise the rental price of land by the same amount (equation 23) and to 
increase the total profit of a farmer proportionally to his initial endowment in land 
(equation 26). Equations (24), (25) and (27) show that, in this particular case, the land 
subsidy has no impact on the number of farms/farmers (equation 24), neither on the 
exports of the agricultural commodity (equation 27). 
This last result suggests that a land subsidy may be considered as a decoupled 
income support instrument, provided that there are restrictions on eligible land (and 
hence, payments) through the use on an aggregate base area.
7 In other words, this result 
shows that a policy instrument that does not fully conform to all green box eligibility 
criteria (as defined in points 1 and 6 for income support measures in Annex 2 of the 
URAA) may nevertheless has minimal distortion effects on trade.
8 
From a European Union (EU) perspective, the situation depicted in the above 
particular case corresponds to the current situation in the Common Market Organisation 
(CMO) for cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (hereafter COP crops), if we consider 
COP crops as one aggregate only. Therefore, from a WTO negotiation point of view, 
the EU could rightfully argue that the area payments in force in the EU COP sector have 
                                                            
7 Of course, this result is contingent to the model used, i.e., a static framework without risk and uncer-
tainty and considering only one aggregate output. 
8 The land subsidy considered in this paper does not conform to criterion (iv) and (v) of point 6 of Annex 
2, i.e., respectively, the payment will not be related to or based on the factors of production employed and 
no production shall be required to receive the payment.   14 
(at least at the aggregate level) minimal trade distortion effects (so could be considered 
as decoupled), although they do not fully conform to URAA decoupling criteria.
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The production subsidy 
The effects of a production subsidy (sp) on the endogenous and target variables 
may be written as: 
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(33)  0 ) / .( ) / .( det > = dsp dp DE dsp dX M p  
 
Then, our analytical framework leads to find common results regarding the ef-
fects of a production subsidy. It unambiguously decreases the output price (equation 
28), increases the rental price of land (equation 29), increases the intensification level 
(equation 31), increases the total profit of a farmer (equation 32) and increases the ex-
ports of the agricultural commodity (equation 33). 
The only ambiguous effect of the production subsidy relates to the number of 
farmers. Equation (30) shows that the production subsidy will unambiguously increase 
the number of farmers when the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with 
respect to land is lower than one. When this elasticity is greater than one, the impact is 
indeterminate and can become negative when the positive effect of the first right-hand 
side term of the square brackets in (30) is outweighed by the negative effect of the sec-
ond right-hand side term of the square brackets in (30). 
                                                            
9 Obviously, this does not mean that the current EU area payments to COP crops have no effect on the 
domestic aggregated supply of COP crops with respect to a free market situation. This would be the case 
only if the current EU base area for COP crops is not larger than the total area which would be devoted to 
COP crops in a non interventionist regime. The URAA however does not, at least explicitly, strictly con-
strain to take the free trade situation as the reference situation. For a discussion on the eligibility to the 
green box of EU compensatory payments granted in both the COP and the beef sectors, see for example 
Gohin and Guyomard (2000).   15 
One may notice that when both the domestic demand DD and the foreign demand 
DE are price inelastic, the impacts of the production subsidy on the rental price of land, 
the number of farmers, the intensification level and the total profit of a farmer are small. 
Finally, as regards to the four considered policy objectives, one may conclude 
that the production subsidy contributes positively to policy objective n° 1 (agricultural 
income support), but at the expense of increasing trade distortion effects (policy objec-
tive n° 4). It contributes negatively to policy objective n° 3 (negative externality reduc-
tion) while its contribution to policy objective n° 2 (positive externality provision) is 
ambiguous. It may be positive or negative, depending closely on the level of 
l
y ε  relative 
to one. 
Previously presented comparative static results indicate whether, or under which 
conditions, each income support program contributes positively or negatively to the four 
considered agricultural policy objectives. However they do not allow to classify these 
support programs according to their relative ability to achieve these policy objectives. 
Such a classification becomes possible if the effects of each program on policy objec-
tives related target variables are compared on an equal cost/support basis. 
 
4. Equal cost/support comparison of alternative agricultural income sup-
port programs 
In this section, we assume that the initial situation corresponds to the free trade 
equilibrium.
10 In other words we consider that the four income support programs are 
initially not in force. Such an assumption makes the analysis easier. Furthermore it im-
plies that the comparison of the effects of instruments on an equal budget cost basis is 
equivalent to a comparison on an equal total agricultural income support basis. 
Secondly, we consider only three of the four previous agricultural income sup-
port programs: the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo), the land subsidy 
(t) and the production subsidy (sp). As the only non-zero effect of the decoupled subsidy 
without mandatory production (mno) is to raise, by the same amount, the farmers' indi-
vidual profit, results of the comparison analysis with other instruments are quite obvi-
ous. 
                                                            
10 In the previous sections, we did not specify the status of the initial market situation because derived 
comparative static results are valid whether the initial situation corresponds to the free trade equilibrium 
or not.   16 
In a first step, we determine the differences between effects induced by each pair 
of instruments for the three endogenous variables and the four policy objectives related 
variables, for a constant budget cost/income support. Then, we examine the signs of 
these differences. Results of this first step are reported in Table 2. In a second step, the 
three programs are classified according to their relative ability to achieve the four con-
sidered agricultural policy objectives. Results of this second step are synthesized in Ta-
ble 3. 
 
Comparison of the effects of alternative agricultural income support programs 
The differences between the effects induced by each pair of programs for en-
dogenous and target variables are provided in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
As previously shown, when a program has an ambiguous effect on a variable, 
the sign of this effect is always closely related to the order of magnitude relative to one 
of, either 
l
y ε  (the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to land 
quantity), 
y
l ε  (the restricted Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to 
output level), or both. It is thus, not surprising that when the difference between the ef-
fects induced by each pair of instruments on one variable is ambiguous, its sign depends 
always directly on the level of one or both these elasticities relative to one. 
 
The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) vs the land subsidy (t) 
Panel 2.a. shows that, for an equal budget cost, the decoupled subsidy with man-
datory production leads unambiguously to a greater increase in the number of 
farms/farmers than the land subsidy. For all other considered variables, the signs of the 
differences between the impacts of both instruments depend exclusively on the level of 
the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to land quantity (
l
y ε ) 
relative to one. 
If this elasticity is lower than unity, then the decoupled subsidy with mandatory 
production leads to a higher decrease (in absolute terms) in the price of the agricultural 
output than the one induced by the land subsidy. In that case, the decoupled subsidy 
with mandatory production leads to a greater positive trade distortion effect than the   17 
land subsidy. In the opposite case (i.e.,  1 > ε
l
y ), the positive trade distortion effect in-
duced by the land subsidy is always greater than the trade distortion resulting from the 
application of the decoupled subsidy.
11 
Similar results may be derived for the rental price of land and the farmers' indi-
vidual profit. When the restricted Marshallian elasticity 
l
y ε  is lower than one, the in-
creases in the rental price of land and then in the farmers' individual profit generated by 
the land subsidy outperform those obtained with the decoupled subsidy.
12 In the oppo-
site case (i.e.,  1 > ε
l
y ), the implementation of the decoupled subsidy leads to higher in-
creases in both the rental price of land and the farmers' individual profit than the land 
subsidy.
13 
Finally, once again, similar conclusions arise when comparing the effects of both 
instruments on yields per hectare. When the restricted Marshallian elasticity 
l
y ε  is lower 
than one, the decrease in the level of intensification resulting from the implementation 
of the land subsidy outperforms the one observed with the decoupled subsidy. In the 
opposite case (i.e.,  1 > ε
l
y ), the decoupled subsidy leads to a decrease in the level of in-
tensification, decrease which is higher (in absolute terms) than the one induced by the 
land subsidy. 
 
                                                            
11 When  1 > ε
l
y , the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production may lead either to a decrease or an 
increase in the price of the agricultural output. In case of a decrease, this latter will be lower (in absolute 
terms) than the one induced by the land subsidy. Hence, agricultural commodity exports will raise more 
with the land subsidy than with the decoupled subsidy. In case of an increase, exports of the agricultural 
commodity will decrease with the decoupled subsidy while raising with the land subsidy. Therefore, in 
both cases, the positive trade distortion effect resulting from the land subsidy application will be higher 
than the trade distortion effect (positive or negative) induced by the decoupled subsidy. 
12 Let's remind that the change in the rental price of land and, consequently, in the farmers' individual 
profit resulting from the application of the decoupled subsidy may be positive or negative. It is positive if 
the restricted Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output level (
y
l ε ) is lower than 
one, and negative otherwise. 




yε ε  is always smaller than one. Therefore, when 
l
y ε  is greater than one, 
y
l ε  is neces-
sarily lower than one. In other words, when  1 > ε
l
y , the decoupled subsidy leads necessarily to increase 
the rental price of land and, consequently, the farmers' individual profit. And these increases are greater 
than the ones induced by the land subsidy.   18 
 
The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) vs the production subsidy (sp) 
As in the previous case, Panel 2.b. indicates that, for an equal budget cost, the 
decoupled subsidy with mandatory production leads unambiguously to a greater in-
crease in the number of farms/farmers than the land subsidy. However, for all other 
considered variables, the signs of the differences between the impacts of both instru-
ments now depend exclusively on the level of the restricted Hicksian derived demand 
elasticity of land with respect to output quantity (
y
l ε ) relative to one. 
The following results apply when this elasticity is greater than unity. The de-
coupled subsidy necessarily leads to a decrease in the price of the agricultural output, 
decrease which is greater (in absolute terms) than the one induced by the production 
subsidy. Therefore, the decoupled subsidy generates a positive trade distortion effect 
that is higher than the one induced by the production subsidy. The increase in the rental 
price of land and then in the farmers' individual profit generated by the production sub-
sidy is always greater than the change observed in both variables (which may be posi-
tive or negative) with the decoupled subsidy. Finally, the decoupled subsidy induces an 
increase in the level of intensification, increase which is greater than the one resulting 
from the production subsidy implementation.  
One observes opposite results when the restricted Hicksian elasticity 
y
l ε  is lower 
than one. 
 
The land subsidy (t) vs the production subsidy (sp) 
As shown in the previous section, the land subsidy and the production subsidy 
both lead unambiguously to a decrease in the price of the agricultural output. However, 
Panel 2.c. suggests that, for an equal budget cost, the land subsidy induces a lower out-
put price reduction (in absolute terms) than the production subsidy. Therefore, on an 
equal cost/support basis, the positive trade distortion effect generated by the land sub-
sidy is always lower than the one resulting from the production subsidy. 
In the same way, it has been shown in section 3 that both instruments raise the 
rental price of land and, consequently, the farmers' individual profit. However, on an 
equal cost/support basis, the increase observed in both variables is always greater with 
the land subsidy than with the production subsidy.   19 
The comparison of the impacts of the land and the production subsidies on the 
level of intensification is quite obvious since the former induces a decrease in yields per 
hectare while the latter makes this indicator to increase. 
Finally, Panel 2.c. reveals that, contrary to the two previous pairs of instruments, 
the only ambiguous result regarding the comparison, on an equal cost/support basis, of 
the impacts of the land and the production subsidies relates to their relative effects on 
the number of farms/farmers. When the restricted Hicksian elasticity 
y
l ε  is lower than 
one while the restricted Marshallian elasticity 
l
y ε  is greater than one, then the increase in 
the number of farms/farmers induced by the land subsidy is always higher than the 
change observed in the same variable with the production subsidy (change which may 
be positive or negative). One observed the opposite situation when the restricted Hick-
sian elasticity 
y
l ε  is greater than one while the restricted Marshallian elasticity 
l
y ε  is 
lower than one. When both elasticities are lower than one, both instruments make the 
number of farms/ farmers to increase. But the sign of the difference between their rela-
tive impacts remains ambiguous. 
 
Classification of the alternative income support programs according to their ability to 
achieve the four policy objectives 
Based on the results reported in Table 2, we are in a good position to classify the 
programs with respect to their ability to achieve policy objectives. Table 3 reports the 
obtained classification, for each of the three possible sets of conditions, with grade 1 for 
the most effective program and grade 3 for the worst effective one. Hence, on an equal 
cost/support basis, the following results arise: 
i) for all possible sets of conditions on the levels relative to one of the Marshallian and 
Hicksian elasticities, 
l
y ε  and 
y
l ε , the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) 
is the most effective instrument as regards to policy objective n° 2, i.e., under our hy-
potheses, for promoting the provision of positive externalities and/or public goods; 
ii) when  1 > ε
l
y  and  1 ≤ ε
y
l , the decoupled subsidy (mo) is the most effective instrument as 
regards to the four policy objectives. In order words, this decoupled subsidy program is 
the most effective instrument for simultaneously supporting agricultural income, pro-
moting positive externalities and reducing negative externalities, while generating 
minimal distortion effects on trade;   20 
iii) for the two other sets of conditions (i.e.,  1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 ≤ ε
y
l  or  1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 > ε
y
l ), the 
decoupled subsidy is never the most effective instrument as regards to policy objectives 
n° 1, 3 and 4. It is always dominated by, at least, the land subsidy; 
iv) when 1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 ≤ ε
y
l  or  1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 > ε
y
l , the land subsidy (t) is the most effective 
program as regards to policy objectives n° 1, 3 and 4. In other words, the land subsidy is 
more effective than other instruments in supporting agricultural income and reducing 
negative externalities, while inducing minimal trade distortion effects; 
v) whatever the possible set of conditions on the levels relative to one of the Marshal-
lian and Hicksian elasticities, 
l
y ε  and 
y
l ε , the production subsidy (sp) is never the most 
effective instrument as regards to the four considered policy objectives. When  1 > ε
l
y  and 
1 ≤ ε
y
l , it ranks last for all policy objectives. When  1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 ≤ ε
y
l , it ranks last for all 
policy objectives, but n° 2 (where the ranking between the land and the production sub-
sidies is indeterminate). When  1 ≤ ε
l
y  and  1 > ε
y
l , the production subsidy dominates the 
decoupled subsidy for all policy objectives, but n° 2. 
From a policy perspective, our theoretical framework allows us to state that, on 
an equal cost/support basis, and except specific conditions, no program uniformly 
dominates others for achieving simultaneously the four considered policy objectives.
14 
In other words and in accordance with the "targeting rule", no instrument does allow to 
achieve effectively simultaneously several policy objectives. Thus, a government con-
sidering a specific instrument necessarily faces trade-off between objectives. In the 
same vein, a government pursuing different policy objectives may be well-advised to 
mobilize various policy instruments.  
From a WTO negotiation perspective, our production subsidy program would 
certainly be qualified as a amber box measure while both other instruments would likely 
be considered as green or blue box measures. Our theoretical framework then suggests 
that amber-box measures are not likely to be the most effective instruments in promot-
ing multifunctionality, provided the definition of this notion in this paper. By way of 
consequence, promoting multifunctionality does not appear as an undeniable justifica-
tion for claiming the continuation of amber box measures in future WTO negotiations. 
                                                            
14 Specific conditions corresponds here to the case where  1 > ε
l
y  and  1 ≤ ε
y
l . Indeed in that case, the de-
coupled subsidy with mandatory production dominates both other instruments as regards to the four con-
sidered policy objectives.   21 
On the other hand, determining which green or blue box measure promotes most effec-
tively multifunctionality while minimizing trade distortion effects is not a trivial matter. 
This depends on conditions that cannot be predicted by theory alone. To this regards, 
our results put emphasis on the key role of both the restricted Marshallian supply elas-
ticity of output with respect to land quantity and Hicksian derived demand elasticity of 
land with respect to output quantity.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper develops a theoretical framework in order to analyze the ability of 
traditional programs of agricultural income support in achieving potentially conflict-
ing/complementary policy objectives. This framework, which allows for free entry into 
the agricultural sector and land price endogeneity, show that attempts to evaluate the 
relative merits of various agricultural policies should take into account the impacts that 
these policies have on both individual producers (impact at the individual margin) and 
the number of producers (impact at the collective margin). For some instruments and 
some policy goals, impacts may be contrary to intuition or to results derived from a 
model with a fixed number of firms and/or an exogenous price of farmland. Moreover, 
this framework allows to identify the two key parameters that have a substantial bearing 
on the relative effectiveness of various instruments. The next step on the research 
agenda will obviously be the empirical evaluation of these crucial parameters.  
Many research directions represent important avenues for further study. For in-
stance, the model is very stylized with only one output, and one single and crude indica-
tor for negative externalities as well as for positive externalities. This is valuable for 
conceptual understanding of the importance of entry-exit decisions and land market 
characteristics, but specific policy problems should be analyzed for particular agricul-
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Table 1. The comparative static analysis of alternative income support policies 
  Impact of a decoupled subsidy without mandatory production 
(mno) on 
Total profit of a farmer   + 
Number of farms/farmers  0 
Intensification level  0 
Agricultural output exports  0 
  Impact of a decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) 
on 
Total profit of a farmer  Ambiguous: + when  1 ≤ ε
y
l ; 
  +/- when  1 ≥ ε
y
l  
Number of farms/farmers  + 
Intensification level  Ambiguous: + when  1 ≥ ε
y
l  and  1 ≤ ε
l
y ; 
  - when  1 ≤ ε
y
l  and  1 ≥ ε
l
y ; 
  +/- when  1 ≤ ε
y
l  and  1 ≤ ε
l
y  
Agricultural output exports  Ambiguous: + when  1 ≤ ε
l
y ; 
  +/- when  1 ≥ ε
l
y  
  Impact of a land subsidy (t) on 
  General case  Particular case ( 0 = = r r Dl Sl ) 
Total profit of a farmer  + + 
Number of farms/farmers  Ambiguous: + when  1 ≤ ε
y
l ; 




Intensification level  - 0 
Agricultural output exports  + 0 
  Impact of a production subsidy (sp) 
Total profit of a farmer  + 
Number of farms/farmers  Ambiguous: + when  1 ≤ ε
l
y ; 
  +/- when  1 ≥ ε
l
y  
Intensification level  + 
Agricultural output exports  + 
Note:  l nf l w sp p y
l
y log / ) , , , ( log ∂ + ∂ = ε , and  y nf t r w y l
y
l log / ) , , , ( log ∂ − ∂ = ε . 
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Table 2. Equal cost/support comparison of the effects of each pair of instruments 
on the various endogenous and target variables 
Panel 2.a. mo vs t 
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Panel 2.c. t vs sp 
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Table 3. Ranking of equal cost/support instruments according to the four policy 
objectives 
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Appendix 
Details of calculations 
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The determinant of M, detM, is positive since it can be written as: 
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(a2)  p r r rr r pr Dl Sl K K dmo dp M π − + π − π π = ) ( ) / ( . det  
(a3)  p rp r p p pp K DE DD K dmo dr M π π + π − − π − = ) ( ) / ( . det  
(a4) 
2 2 ) )( ( ) / ( . det pr r r rr p p pp K Dl Sl K DE DD K dmo dK M π − − + π − − π =  
These three equations may equivalently be written as: 
(a5)  p r r
l
y p rr p r r
p rr
r pr
p rr Dl Sl K Dl Sl K dmo dp M π − − ε − π π − = π − −
π π
π − π
+ π π − = ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ]
) (
1 [ ) / ( . det  
(a6)  ) )( ( ) 1 )( ( ) )( ( ]
) (
1 )[ ( ) / ( . det r p p
y
l r pp r p p
r pp
p rp
r pp DE DD K DE DD K dmo dr M π − + − ε − π − π = π − + −
π − π
π π
+ π − π =  
(a7)  0 ) )( ( ) ( ) ( ) / ( . det
2 2 > − + π + − − π + π − π π = r r rr p p r r pp pr rr pp Dl Sl K DE DD Dl Sl K K dmo dK M  
The impact of mo on y and l may be written as, respectively: 
(a8) 
0 )] )( ( ) ( ) ( )[ det / 1 (
]] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ )[ det / 1 (
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π + π =
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(a9) 
0 )] )( ( ) ( ) )( ( )[ det / 1 (
]] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ )[ det / 1 (
) / .( ) / .( /
< π − − − π − π − π + π − π π − π π − =
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π − π − =
r p p rr p r r rp r pr rp rr pp
p rp r p p pp rr p r r rr r pr rp
rr rp
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From (a8) and (a9), we readily derive the impact of mo on intensification in (yields per hectare): 
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